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 This paper discusses the argument of the “militarization” of police SWAT teams. 
This argument states that these specialized police tactical teams have become too 
much like our military and as such are too violent and too often used. This argument is 
countered with figures showing that SWAT teams actually decrease the likelihood of 
violence and that SWAT responses to violent domestic crimes and terrorism are 
needed, as traditional police responses are not adequate. It also postulates that much of 
the militarization argument is based on semantics and inflammatory language; while at 
the same time, it concedes that these complaints may be a necessary function to 
monitor and regulate police behavior. Lastly, the argument is discussed from a Marxian 
conflict theory perspective, as well as that of a neo-functionalist perspective. The conflict 
theory explores the above-mentioned aspect of complaints regulating police abuse, 
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There appears to be a significant movement criticizing today’s police SWAT 
units.  A vocal segment, using print media and especially the Internet, has launched a 
crusade using the terms “militarization” and “para-militarization” to describe what it 
appears to believe to be U.S. police agencies’ trend toward violent control of its citizens.  
The extent of this issue can be illustrated using a simple Internet search.  An Internet 
search on 07/31/2003 using the Google search engine provided two examples.  Using the 
search terms “POLICE” and “MILITARIZATION,” 20,000 sites were produced; while 
using the terms “SWAT” and “MILITARIZATION” produced 857 sites (using the term 
“SWAT” in place of the word “police” appeared to limit the hits almost exclusively to 
articles and web pages referring to American civilian policing).  The relevance of 
examining this criticism of our police appears obvious: Americans hold their civil 
liberties as sacrosanct, and any potential threat of those liberties must be taken seriously 
until proven otherwise.  An example of this is the legal (and political) tightrope on which 
law enforcement has walked since September 11th and issues in criminal profiling people 
of Middle Eastern descent. 
The militarization claim appears to primarily allege that this supposed trend is 
making our police too violent and too often utilized.  This paper will discuss the concept 
of militarization and U.S. police and many of the specific criticisms cited regarding this 
issue with the ultimate goal of answering the question: Have our police agencies become 
militarized?  This paper will attempt to analyze this question by review of related 
literature, a limited survey of certain Texas police agencies, and an analysis of internal 
after-action reports from a combined agency SWAT team.   The review of literature will 
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consist of articles gleaned from Internet sources such as professional articles, newspaper 
articles, and web page articles.  No books were found that specifically addressed this 
issue.  The survey consisted of a questionnaire directed to police professionals 
representing twenty-one Texas police agencies and which asked a series of questions 
related to the SWAT issue discussed in this paper.  Lastly, an analysis of after-action 
reports spanning 1996 through 2003 from the Combined Agency Response Team, a 
SWAT team composed of officers from the Alvin, League City, and Pearland Police 
Departments in Texas. 
It is anticipated that the research will show that the “militarization” argument of 
American police agencies becoming too-like the U.S. military is over-stated in the 
extreme and that it will instead show that, while police have responded to changing 
circumstances, they have maintained their subservience to the will of the American 
people. 
American law enforcement by its very nature must be cognizant of the citizens it 
serves and the expectations and desires of the public.  An understanding of public 
criticisms, and an ability to accurately answer those criticisms, is a requisite for any 
public agency in a free society.  This research will aspire to discuss and answer this 
particular criticism of American law enforcement SWAT teams, and lastly, to suggest 
follow-up research and recommendations to further evaluate this issue.   
Review of Literature 
 S.W.A.T. is an acronym for Special Weapons and Tactics police units. These 
special police units were originally created in the 1960s and 1970s to answer a new 
police challenge: the determined domestic terrorist. Today, teams exist to handle “critical 
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incident” situations that even the contemporary well trained patrol officer would be hard-
pressed to handle; however, there are critics who decry the militarization of the police, 
arguing that this makes our police too violent and too oft used. While abuses likely do 
occur, it can also be argued that these problems are not symptomatic of today’s policing 
and that when isolated problems do arise, both internal and external outcry (and the 
usually resultant litigation) quickly addresses the issues, departments, and personnel 
involved. 
SWAT teams came into vogue due largely to two critical incidents: one occurring 
in the 1960s in Texas; and the second, a string of violent encounters with the Symbionese 
Liberation Army (SLA) in the early 1970s. The first catalyst was the University of Texas 
(UT) shootings by 23-year-old Charles Whitman in 1966 in which Whitman, using 
various high-powered rifles from the height of the 28-story UT clock tower, shot and 
initially killed 14 people and wounded approximately 30 more (Holley, 1996). 
Interestingly, the fifteenth fatality to this tragedy was not recorded until 2001 when 
Whitman shooting victim David Gunby voluntarily withdrew from dialysis treatment and 
died a few days later. The coroner ruled his death a homicide as a direct result of his 
injuries sustained 35 years ago in the UT shootings (Henderson, 2001). The second 
catalyst was a number of terrorist incidents by the SLA, which culminated in the 1974 
two-hour shoot-out in which SLA members used automatic weapons against Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) patrol officers. Two SLA members were shot dead as they 
exited the house firing at police and six others were found dead inside the house after 
refusing to come out even after the house caught fire (Wikipedia, 2002). When these 
events occurred, SWAT teams did not exist, equipment was limited, and officers did not 
4 
wear the ballistic vests available today. According to one report of the UT shooting, a 
police officer, lacking a handheld radio tried to call his police department via telephone–
and received a busy signal–while other officers made calls on AM radios asking for 
hunters with deer rifles to respond to the scene (Holley, 1996).   
Kopel (2000), a critic of today’s SWAT “trend,” in his article “Smash-up policing 
– when law enforcement goes military” cited officers “waving machine guns, spewing 
foul language, threatening to shoot people, and trashing the house” (p.1). He goes on to 
sprinkle his article with derogatory terms, such as officers being dressed in “battle gear,” 
“paramilitary units,” and their “special violent skills” (p.1).  The reference to “battle 
dress” refers to the common SWAT officer’s black BDU uniforms (which is a military 
acronym for battle dress uniform). Kopel goes on to quote a Rutgers professor citing that 
this clothing can be related to tapping “into associations between the color black and 
authority, invincibility, and the power to violate laws with impunity” (p.2). This claim 
appears spurious; as any officer violating laws with impunity soon finds himself a pariah 
in the law enforcement community, and usually in prison in short order.  Interestingly, a 
current trend in contemporary law enforcement SWAT teams is a move away from the 
traditional black BDU’s to military green or urban camouflage BDU’s.  It is not clear if 
this is in answer to the above criticism, or due to other considerations, such as economic 
and effectiveness factors. 
Kopel also adds the claim that, “ . . . it is ex-military who account for almost all 
SWAT-team members” (p.2); however he adds no justification for this last assertion.  
Although many ex-military do find themselves in law enforcement, no statistical 
information could be found on the make-up of SWAT officers with prior military 
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experience.  A review of personnel belonging to a multi-agency SWAT team serving the 
cities of Alvin, League City, and Pearland (this team is described in more detail later in 
this paper) showed that of the 30 officers on the team, only seven had any prior military 
experience.        
Bovard’s article “Time to curb SWAT rampages” reports “the explosive growth 
and expanding mission of SWAT teams has, in turn, led to complaints that an occupying 
army is marching through America’s streets⎯that they are too aggressive, too heavily 
armed, too scary” (1999, p.1). The article goes on to state, “Once local governments 
militarize the police, they naturally find more and more pretexts to send out their storm 
troopers⎯if for nothing else than to keep people in place” (p.1).  Along with “massive 
federal aid” in money and equipment, police officers supposedly find “massive 
intimidation” easier than “old fashioned police work…” (p.2). This writer makes the 
direct accusation that “No-knock SWAT raids at wrong addresses have become a national 
scandal,” but he then fails to provide a single example. He does cite a 48-year-old 
suicidal male in San Antonio who was killed when tactical police responded to “stop him 
from committing suicide” (without details of the incident). He then lastly cites a fire in 
Massachusetts started from a police “stun grenade” while police were looking for a drug 
dealer⎯the fire leaving 24 people homeless. He finishes his criticism of SWAT with the 
appeal that “Average, peaceful Americans should not need to worry about government 
agents storming into their homes on the flimsiest of pretexts” (Bovard, 1999). 
Much of the criticism seems to hinge completely on negative semantic rhetoric 
and arguments, and depending on one’s perception, could go either way. For example, 
SWAT teams are also now called Emergency Response Teams, Tactical Response 
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Teams, Combined Agency Response Teams and a host of other friendlier, more 
politically correct sounding names; however, the mission remains the same. Officers once 
called snipers are now marksmen, assault teams are now entry teams, stun grenades and 
flash-bangs are now distraction devices, rifles and assault weapons are now long guns – 
all terms sterilized to make them less offensive, but all describing the same thing as their 
predecessors. 
 One critic postulated “Police militarization promotes maximal use of force as a 
solution, even when no force at all is required” (Kopel, 2000, p.3). This argument, and 
many of the previously mentioned ones, either insinuates or outright claims that SWAT is 
too violent, uses intimidation, or uses too much force (or all three). According to a 
preliminary National Tactical Officer’s Association (NTOA) report, there were 385 
reported critical incidents involving SWAT in the U.S. in 1999. A critical incident is 
defined as an incident in which a weapon is used⎯not just present, but used⎯and in 
which “there are injuries to victims and/or officers, and there is a real threat to the 
community’s health and welfare” (Glick, 2000, p.2). Of those 385 incidents, 341 were 
“resolved without shots fired after SWAT arrived” and only seven resulted in an officer-
involved shooting, in which a total of five suspects were killed. 193 of the incidents were 
hostage/barricade situations and the other 134 were warrant service (Glick, 2000). These 
statistics seem to clearly indicate that SWAT presence does not escalate what was in most 
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One possible cause of the perception of violence is the overwhelming show of 
force. This allegation is true.  SWAT teams want to be intimidating. It is believed that an 
intimidated suspect is less likely to challenge police and more likely to give up 
peacefully–as the above statistics appear to testify. The goal of a SWAT officer, as well 
as any other officer, is the protection of innocent victims, as well as himself and his 
fellow officers. While care is also taken to assure the well being of the suspect, the 
welfare of the suspect is ultimately up to the suspect through his own actions. 
The excessive use of SWAT teams claim is harder to quantify. This criticism is 
usually applied to use of SWAT in situations where a search or arrest warrant is to be 
served. If the target is a violent armed criminal, SWAT use is usually not argued. 
However, it is when a narcotics search warrant is served, where the person may or may 
not be armed, that the reasoning becomes a little more tenuous. There is always the 
argument that the drug trade is violent and the person may be armed; however the 
primary law enforcement motive is usually preservation of evidence. To knock on a drug 
dealers’ door and wait patiently for him to come to the door and allow you inside to find 
evidence that will likely place him in prison is unrealistic. If entry is not quick and 
efficient, and the evidence secured, it will be literally–and quickly–flushed down the 
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drain.  SWAT officers, unlike the average street officer, are trained and equipped to 
execute these type dynamic entries.   
The other primary criticism that can be gleaned from these complaints is that 
there are too many SWAT teams. One critic is reported to have claimed that there were as 
many as 30,000 SWAT teams currently in the United States (Glick, 2000). This would be 
difficult, since only 13,535 local, state, and federal police agencies in the United States 
reported to the 2000 Department of Justice Annual Report (DOJ). And not all police 
agencies have a SWAT team. A 1997 conducted NTOA survey of 2,027 police agencies 
with more than 50 sworn officers showed that only 58% of these agencies had tactical 
teams. There were only 24 full-time SWAT teams in the entire U.S.; as only the largest of 
cities can afford a full-time team. The survey also showed that “16 percent of all tactical 
teams were established in the 1960s, 53 percent in the 1970s, 18 percent in the 1980s, and 
13 percent in the 1990s” (Glick, 2000, p.3).  All this indicating that the vast majority of 
SWAT teams are well established, and not the product of recent explosive growth as 
some critics insinuate (Bovard, 1999) (Figure 2). 



















The phenomenon of rural school shootings argue against the myth that violence 
only occurs in urban settings. SWAT teams are a valuable tool and insurance even in the 
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smallest of agencies – and also augment the line patrol officer ranks with better-equipped 
and trained officers charged with the initial response to critical incidents. The creation of 
part-time multi-agency tactical teams seems to have filled this need for those smaller 
agencies unable to field a team due to lack of resources and manpower.  
In answer to the criticism that police are relying on “massive intimidation rather 
than old fashioned police work” (Bovard, 1999, p.2) one need only look at the LAPD 
response to the North Hollywood bank robbery in 1997. Two determined bank robbers 
armed with automatic weapons loaded with armor piercing ammunition took on well-
trained LAPD patrol officers⎯who were armed with only pistols and shotguns. These 
officers bravely held their ground, with ten officers being wounded in the process, along 
with five civilians, until the arrival of LAPD full-time SWAT officers who, with better 
equipment and weapons, were able to directly challenge (and subsequently kill) one of 
the two fanatical bank robbers (the other committed suicide) (CNN, 1997). This was not a 
one-time aberration. In Norco, California, in 1980, five heavily armed men robbed a bank 
and in their subsequent escape attempt, killed one police officer, wounded eight more, 
and damaged or destroyed 33 police cars and one police helicopter before being killed or 
captured (Burrows, 2000). One could hardly argue that police were guilty of too much 
intimidation in either setting. 
Society can be violent, and as such, society must have its protectors ready to do 
violence in turn to protect against that threat. Society can and should hold its guardians 
accountable to the standards of the Constitution; however, society should not tie law 
enforcement’s hands and make them ineffective or ask them to risk their lives any more 
than they already do. 
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In another analysis of this issue, conflict theory and functionalism were applied to 
the argument.  Conflict theory in its simplest Marxian’ form argues that groups will be in 
conflict over the inequality of the distribution of power and resources. Max Weber argued 
a similar thought when he stated, “there could be no peace in the economic struggle for 
existence” (Kelly, 2000, p. 215). Marx believed that this disparity would result in conflict 
between the two groups, and that the group with less power would ultimately rise up in 
revolution to overthrow the minority group holding the power and that a more equal 
distribution of resources and power would result (until the process repeated itself) 
(Kelly). As re-stated by Jonathan Turner, “The eruption of conflict leads to a social re-
organization of power relations within a system” (Turner, 1975, p. 619).  
Bovard’s abovementioned accusation of police of using SWAT teams to “ … 
keep people in their place” seems clearly to suggest that the power elite⎯the government 
and those who control it⎯are using the police in the proverbial Marxian struggle. It may 
be argued that this description, as applied to the argument discussed in this paper, has 
legitimacy in that the struggle or criticism of the police can and does in fact lead to 
change. If police tactics are not approved by the people, the subsequent outcry and 
political pressure will invariably lead to a change in police conduct and tactics, as can be 
attested to by the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the positive change in police 
behavior since that time. 
According to Colomy and Greiner, the four key aspects of neo-functionalism are: 
problem-solving, structural differentiation, systems, and culture (Colomy & Greiner, 
2001, p. 159). Applying two of these factors, problem-solving and structural 
differentiation, appears fairly straightforward. The problem-solving aspect seems 
11 
obvious, “Salient social problems that appear to exceed the problem-solving capacities of 
existing structures are a potent impetus to alter the established institutional order” 
(Colomy & Greiner, 2001, p. 161). By definition, when a SWAT team is called upon, the 
incident has exceeded the capabilities of the street police officer. From a structural 
differentiation perspective, the advent of SWAT teams would be merely an expected 
evolution of the police institution in answer to new (violent) challenges to traditional 
police responsibilities. Colomy and Greiner (2001) wrote:  
More specialized or differentiated institutions have responded more efficiently 
and effectively to functional perquisites than have multifunctional (or 
multipurpose) institutions . . .and that . . .structural differentiation can be 
understood, then, as an unconsciously evolved device modern societies have ‘hit 
upon’ to increase their overall effectiveness and efficiency (p. 161).  
Until recently, police agencies consisted of police officers and their supervisors.  
The police officer was responsible for all aspects of police work; whereas today’s police 
departments have many specialty police officers ranging from detectives, bicycle officers, 
crime prevention specialists, and computer specialists . . . to SWAT officers. Frank 
Young repeats this in his paper on “Neo-Durkheimian” sociology in explaining “social 
movements” cause “social innovation” (Young, 1999, p. 9). His “social movements,” in a 
negative sense, can be used to describe the social events (domestic terrorism, etc.) that 
led to the creation and continuance of SWAT teams, while the SWAT teams would be the 
police institutions’ “social innovation” created to answer those issues. Young also 
touches on differentiation and explains that it is, “…the degree to which institutions…are 
specialized” (Young, 1999, p. 9).  
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The militarization of SWAT argument appears specious, and while occasional 
abuses may be occurring, the victims of that abuse along with the media keep a close 
watch for these abuses and⎯rightfully⎯report them to the public. Political pressure and 
court review then usually correct any discrepancies that may be present. Using the 
Marxian conflict theory, this is what should be happening: if the police (in this case, 
representatives of the power elite) overstep their bounds, then the underprivileged 
(victims of police abuse) revolt (complain) and new social order results (the officers 
and/or police practices are replaced or modified if found at fault). The neo-functionalist 
perspective sees SWAT as a natural extension, or specialization, of the traditional police 
institution in a response to new challenges.                 
Methodology 
Have U.S. police agencies, specifically their SWAT teams, become militarized?  
And if so, are they now too violent, too quick to use tactical solutions−too rough?  It is 
believed that although most U.S. police SWAT teams do utilize at least some military 
equipment and incorporate some types of military tactics, this does not mean that our 
police officers have developed a military mentality.  The missions of the two professions 
remain fundamentally different: civilian police have a primary mission to protect life and 
property, even that of the “bad” guy; while the military’s primary mission is to defend the 
United States by destroying the bad guy. 
The review of literature, as well as anecdotal evidence seen frequently on mass 
media outlets, appears to indicate that much⎯if not all⎯of the criticism stems from 
warrant service by SWAT teams (or police officers thought to be SWAT).  One method 
of inquiry used in this research was an email questionnaire sent to police officers 
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representing twenty-two separate law enforcement agencies in Texas.  The questionnaire 
(see appendix A) asked a series of logistical questions to determine the makeup of the 
particular department and whether or not the agency fields a SWAT team.  The question 
was then asked, “Is the team used to serve warrants, and if so, what are the parameters for 
utilizing the team on warrant service?”  The questionnaire finally asks three subjective 
questions: Is the SWAT team worth it? Does the team serve a legitimate purpose in your 
law enforcement community and the community at large?  Are there abuses or areas that 
could use improvement? 
Of the 22 agencies surveyed, six responded with all six agencies having SWAT 
teams (27%).  The agencies ranged in size from 52 officers to 2,300 officers, and serving 
populations ranging from 62,000 to 1.2 million persons.  Only one agency, part of a 
multi-agency SWAT team advised that they responded to all warrant requests, while the 
other five all cited “high risk” prerequisite parameters such as “known danger” or 
“violent felony.” 
Another inquiry was made by analyzing after-action reports of the Combined 
Agency Response Team (CART).  This is a combined agency SWAT team formed in 
1992 by the police departments of the Texas cities of Alvin, Friendswood, League City, 
and Pearland.  The Friendswood Police Department dropped its participation in 1994, 
however the other three agencies remain closely linked.  The three cities have a combined 
population of approximately 118,000 citizens (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002).  The team 
itself is composed of over thirty officers assigned various duties such as tactical, 
negotiations, medic, and command.  The CART team itself, like most SWAT teams, is a 
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part time team consisting of officers from the patrol and detective ranks called together 
for monthly training and for actual call-outs. 
Eighteen CART after-action reports were available to be analyzed.  The reports 
covered call-outs from 1996 through 2003 and could be summated as two types of call-
outs: barricaded subjects and warrant service.  Of the 18 reports, three pertained to 
warrant service, while the other 15 covered barricaded subjects either refusing to submit 
to arrest or suicidal subjects.  Barricaded suicidal subjects accounted for the most call-
outs (ten), while the remaining five could be best characterized as disturbances that 
developed into barricaded suspects with and without hostages.  Two call-outs involved 
shots fired by the suspect.  No shots were reported by CART personnel in any of the call-
outs with the exception of less-lethal munitions involved in two call-outs (12ga. beanbag 
round in one and Advanced Taser in the other).  Only one call-out resulted in a death 
where the suspect fatally shot himself. 
The three call-out reports of most interest, those dealing with warrant service, 
involved warrants for bank robbery, murder, and theft of firearms.  Since part of the 
criticism aimed at SWAT teams infers the excessive or unnecessary use of SWAT in 
warrant services, it is clear that all three of these deployments of the CART team appear 
justified by the nature of the suspects’ offenses.  A review of the three reports showed 
that all three suspects used guns in their original offenses.   
In analyzing the CART after-action reports, a shortcoming was discovered–the 
reporting itself.  After a call-out, the assistant commander of the particular city in which 
the call-out occurs is responsible for completing the after-action report and forwarding it 
to the other commanders.  It was found that although most barricaded suspect/hostage 
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situations appear to have been reported, most warrant services were not.  This appears to 
have been due more to lack of protocol than design, but remains an obstacle to accurate 
statistical analysis in this area.                  
Findings 
 The review of literature appeared to offer the most pertinent support to this 
paper’s hypothesis: that SWAT teams, in general, have not become militarized as critics 
have proclaimed.  Specifically, critics make the claim that SWAT teams have become 
“militarized,” meaning⎯to them⎯that police SWAT teams are too like the military, and 
as such are too violent for civilian law enforcement.  The complaints ranged from the 
ludicrous, such as that SWAT teams were “too scary;” to the more substantial, that 
SWAT teams find reasons to deploy to justify their existence.  The available literature 
appears able to answer most of these complaints directly and show that they are either 
outright incorrect or are just so oversimplified and one-sided that the real picture is 
obscured. 
 The questionnaire used in this study proved problematic in that it should have 
been sent to more agencies.  With 22 agencies surveyed and only six agencies returning 
the instrument, the response rate makes a measure of any veracity doubtful.  It was useful 
in showing that all but one of the responding agencies had guidelines to safeguard against 
inappropriate use of their SWAT teams in serving warrants⎯one of the criticisms lodged 
by the critics of SWAT. 
 The analysis of the Combined Agency Response Team’s after-action reports was 
very useful in illuminating the type calls addressed by that rural team, as well as showing 
their success rate.  Additionally, a review of these reports clearly dispels previously the 
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mentioned accusation that SWAT uses “maximal force as a solution, even when no force 
at all is required.”  The reports show that force is rarely used.  In fact the CART team, in 
existence since November of 1992, has never used deadly force, and has used less-lethal 
tactics only twice, and both of those incidents involved suspects who had been 
brandishing firearms.  Another criticism that SWAT uses intimidation is true, but as 
stated previously, this is a purposeful show of overwhelming force intended to cow the 
aggressive suspect into compliance with police demands without the use of actual force.  
And again, statistics from both the CART team’s after-action reports and the data cited 
by L. Glick in his article appear to strongly support this assertion.        
Conclusions 
 Vocal critics of police tactical teams have made sweeping claims that the SWAT 
“trend” has made civilian police too much like the military, and in so doing has eroded 
Constitutional protections and exposed citizens to excessive force and violence by their 
police.  This paper sought to determine whether this was so, and would argue after 
careful review that the police, specifically SWAT units, have not become militarized as 
these critics define the term.  
The most noticeable limitation noted during this study was the absence of uniform 
reporting.  A police department does not have to report whether or not it has a SWAT 
team; therefore, it was not possible to determine how many agencies actually have 
SWAT teams barring contacting every police agency.  The figures that are cited on both 
sides of the “militarization” argument appear to be estimations.       
Another issue is lack of standardization of the SWAT officers and their training.  
In Texas, this training is somewhat monitored by the Texas Commission on Law 
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Enforcement (TCLEOSE) which sets the current standard for a SWAT officer’s basic 
certification as successfully completing a 50-hour Basic SWAT School; however there is 
no recertification required by TCLEOSE after the initial training.  Additionally, there is 
no standardization of tactical officers.  Many narcotics units use their own officers for 
raids and many use SWAT attire, giving the impression that these are certified SWAT 
officers, when in reality they are not.  As one officer responding to the survey instrument 
noted: “Many agencies just put some street officers in black BDU’s, give them machine 
guns and call them SWAT.” 
Yet another limitation noted was in the lack of uniform reporting in critical 
incidents.  The reporting of SWAT deployments is not mandated, and as such, reliable 
statistical analysis is difficult.  It is suggested that mandatory reporting to a central 
database, such as one sponsored by the National Tactical Officer’s Association or some 
governmental law enforcement agency would likely address this issue. 
Lastly, it is suggested that a uniform set of guidelines for warrant service by 
SWAT teams be established, as well as a uniform definition of what constitutes a SWAT 
officer and team.  This would make for uniform deployment standards across 
jurisdictions and would assist in reliable statistical analysis of data gathered. 
The relevance of this study is in pointing out the need for the law enforcement 
community to conduct routine introspection of their profession in order to monitor their 
own behavior and performance.  Criticisms like those cited in this paper are rarely 
without some kernel of truth, and although in this case it is believed that the criticism is 
derived from a few rare instances of malfeasance, it is law enforcement’s responsibility to 
be able to answer any and all criticisms so that they are able to maintain the trust and 
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respect of the communities they serve.  If these criticisms are not answered appropriately 
to the public, then as in other cases, perception may drive reality and the resultant 
mistrust on both sides could engender the very thing that these critics are decrying.        
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